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hb_pdf_build_indexed_smask() allocated and filled (width+1)*height and width*height bytes straight from the attacker-controlled PNG IHDR, while HB_VECTOR_MAX_DOCUMENT_SIZE was only consulted when the finished mask was appended to the PDF object. A ~1 MB sbix/CBDT font could thus make the PDF backend inflate and un-filter up to a 4 GiB mask per painted glyph, only to drop it afterwards. The mask is emitted uncompressed into a document-capped hb_vector_buf_t, so a mask larger than the cap can never be appended: reject it alongside the existing 32-bit overflow guards in the builder (the same pattern as the raster PNG decoder's HB_RASTER_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE check), which bounds both allocations (raw_len = mask_len + height) before any work is done. add_xobject_png_image() additionally skips registering and referencing the SMask object when its buffer tripped the cap, so the output no longer contains a dangling empty-stream object for an edge-case mask that fits the builder but not the object with its header. Masks that fit today are unaffected. A regression test in test/vector/test-vector-budget.c hand-rolls a zlib stream for a 4097x4096 indexed PNG with tRNS, paints it to PDF, and asserts the render succeeds without an /SMask. Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner, as vulnerability ANT-2026-6AWUPU2N. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>