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harfbuzz/test
Behdad EsfahbodandClaude Opus 4.8 a14c095e3f [vector] Refuse PDF indexed-PNG soft masks larger than the document cap
hb_pdf_build_indexed_smask() allocated and filled (width+1)*height and
width*height bytes straight from the attacker-controlled PNG IHDR, while
HB_VECTOR_MAX_DOCUMENT_SIZE was only consulted when the finished mask was
appended to the PDF object.  A ~1 MB sbix/CBDT font could thus make the
PDF backend inflate and un-filter up to a 4 GiB mask per painted glyph,
only to drop it afterwards.

The mask is emitted uncompressed into a document-capped hb_vector_buf_t,
so a mask larger than the cap can never be appended: reject it alongside
the existing 32-bit overflow guards in the builder (the same pattern as
the raster PNG decoder's HB_RASTER_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE check), which bounds
both allocations (raw_len = mask_len + height) before any work is done.

add_xobject_png_image() additionally skips registering and referencing
the SMask object when its buffer tripped the cap, so the output no longer
contains a dangling empty-stream object for an edge-case mask that fits
the builder but not the object with its header.  Masks that fit today are
unaffected.

A regression test in test/vector/test-vector-budget.c hand-rolls a zlib
stream for a 4097x4096 indexed PNG with tRNS, paints it to PDF, and
asserts the render succeeds without an /SMask.

Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner, as vulnerability ANT-2026-6AWUPU2N.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-30 14:54:23 -06:00
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