Every per-glyph charstring loop in the subsetter (subr_subsetter_t::
subset, subr_flattener_t::flatten, the two CFF2 partial-instancing
passes, the CFF2 instance-metrics loop, and the CFF1 seac closure in
the plan and in the depend builder) created a fresh interpreter bounded
only by HB_CFF_MAX_OPS per charstring. Glyphs can share subroutines,
so a font where every glyph makes one cheap call into a deeply nested
shared subr cost num_glyphs x ~200,000 ops: a 121 KB, 30,000-glyph font
took 33 s to subset (control 0.05 s).
Give each pass one cumulative counter, max(HB_BUDGET_SUBSET_CFF = 2^24,
32 ops per table byte), threaded through cs_interpreter_t::interpret()'s
existing budget argument exactly as the outline and extents paths do.
When it runs out, interpret() fails as it does for a single over-limit
charstring, so the CFF/CFF2 table fails to subset (the subset fails, as
any CFF planning failure has since dde7da182e); the seac closure fails
the plan and the depend builder fails. The 32-ops-per-byte allowance
was measured against the in-tree corpus, where real fonts interpret at
most a few operations per CFF byte, so they stay far below it and
produce byte-identical output; the attacker font now fails in 0.17 s.
Adds test_subset_cff1_shared_subrs: four shared-subr glyphs subset
fine, while a hundred of them exhaust the budget and the subset (and
the dependency builder) fail.
Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner, as vulnerability ANT-2026-Z5NLRFA6.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>