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The desktop app wrote its control token to <temp>/texturecraft-control-<port>.token with default permissions (world-readable in a shared /tmp), from a hash-based generator, and compared it non-constant-time with no connection limit. Any local user could read the token and drive the app, whose command.run takes host paths. - Token files are created new (remove, then O_EXCL) with mode 0600, so a planted file or symlink can neither keep its permissions nor redirect the write; one that cannot be replaced disables the server with a hint to set TEXTURECRAFT_CONTROL_TOKEN. - Clients only read a token file that is a regular file owned by them with no group or other permissions, opened without following symlinks or blocking on a FIFO. - The app's control server uses the shared security module: OS-random 256-bit token, constant-time compare, validated and trimmed env token, bounded lines and at most 16 connections. - Connections must authenticate within 10 s (AuthDeadline) and get one attempt. - The app and `serve --port` bind before writing the token file, so a server whose port is busy no longer replaces the running server's token. Regression tests cover owner-only files over an existing open file, symlink and FIFO handling, the auth deadline, the connection limit and the app's token checks. Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 5.5 <noreply@anthropic.com>