Files
wgpu/.github/workflows/head-approved.yml
T

97 lines
4.2 KiB
YAML

# Posts a passing `head-approved` check on approved pull request heads.
#
# The check passes on a commit when one of these is true:
#
# - A user with write access approved this exact commit.
# - A trusted actor pushed this commit, and the previous head commit passed or
# a user with write access approved it. Trusted actors are users with write
# access and Mergify.
# - The commit is the head of a Mergify merge queue pull request, and each of
# its parents passed or is in the default branch.
#
# Branch protection on `trunk` requires this check. Check results belong to a
# commit, so a new push has no result. Thus GitHub blocks the merge of commits
# that a user without write access pushed after the last approval.
#
# Security rules. Read these before you change this file:
#
# - This workflow runs with secrets on events that untrusted users can cause.
# Do not check out, build, or run code from a pull request. The checkout
# step gets `.github/scripts/head-approved.py` from the default branch. Do
# not set its `ref`.
# - Do not put text that a pull request controls (titles, branch names, commit
# messages) in a `run:` script. Give values to scripts only through `env:`.
# - The `workflow_run` trigger can come from a fork, because a fork controls
# the workflow file that sends it. Use its payload only to find the pull
# request. Read all other data from the API.
# - Only post passing checks. A check result applies to all pull requests with
# the same head commit. If this workflow posts failures, an outsider can push
# the head commit of another pull request and block it.
# - Branch protection must require this check from the `head-approved` app and
# not from "any source". If not, a fork can post a check with this name.
# - The required check must stay in classic branch protection, or in a ruleset
# that Mergify cannot bypass. If Mergify can bypass it, GitHub does not
# enforce it when Mergify merges.
# - The app private key is in the `head-approved` environment, which only
# `trunk` can use. Give the app only the "Checks: write" permission.
name: Head approved
on: # zizmor: ignore[dangerous-triggers] This workflow does not run pull request code.
pull_request_target:
types: [opened, synchronize]
workflow_run:
workflows: ["Head approved review"]
types: [completed]
permissions: {}
jobs:
head-approved:
name: Post head-approved check
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
timeout-minutes: 10
permissions:
# Finds runs of this workflow that are not complete.
actions: read
# Reads the check result on the previous head commit.
checks: read
# Reads pull requests and their reviews.
pull-requests: read
environment:
name: head-approved
deployment: false
steps:
- name: Create app token
id: app
uses: actions/create-github-app-token@bcd2ba49218906704ab6c1aa796996da409d3eb1 # v3.2.0
with:
client-id: ${{ vars.HEAD_APPROVED_CLIENT_ID }}
private-key: ${{ secrets.HEAD_APPROVED_PRIVATE_KEY }}
permission-checks: write
- name: Check out script
uses: actions/checkout@3d3c42e5aac5ba805825da76410c181273ba90b1 # v7.0.1
with:
persist-credentials: false
sparse-checkout: .github/scripts/head-approved.py
sparse-checkout-cone-mode: false
- name: Evaluate and post check
env:
APP_TOKEN: ${{ steps.app.outputs.token }}
APP_SLUG: ${{ steps.app.outputs.app-slug }}
READ_TOKEN: ${{ github.token }}
REPO: ${{ github.repository }}
EVENT: ${{ github.event_name }}
ACTION: ${{ github.event.action }}
PR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.number }}
HEAD_SHA: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.sha }}
HEAD_REPO: ${{ github.event.pull_request.head.repo.full_name }}
PR_AUTHOR: ${{ github.event.pull_request.user.login }}
DEFAULT_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.repository.default_branch }}
BEFORE: ${{ github.event.before }}
SENDER: ${{ github.event.sender.login }}
RUN_HEAD_OWNER: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_repository.owner.login }}
RUN_HEAD_BRANCH: ${{ github.event.workflow_run.head_branch }}
run: python3 .github/scripts/head-approved.py