Mutable action tags are a supply-chain risk: a moved tag runs different code
without a diff. Every workflow action is now pinned through
.github/workflows/actions.lock, and CI verifies the lockfile so an out-of-sync
or tampered one fails instead of running.
Each third-party action that StepSecurity publishes a secure drop-in
replacement for now uses that replacement, pinned to a commit with its
version as a comment. Versions follow what we used: the newest
StepSecurity release in the same major, or the closest major they
publish. dtolnay/rust-toolchain refs that named a toolchain (stable,
nightly, 1.76) become the replacement's `toolchain` input.
Adds step-security/harden-runner (audit, pinned to v2.22.4 like
craft-common-actions) as the first step of each job that did not have it,
so every workflow in the org's public repos reports its egress to
StepSecurity. Audit, not block: block-mode allow lists come from each
job's observed traffic.
Record the answers to D1-D6, require an outside security review
before public launch and two maintainers for native releases, say that
native plugins are the exception to protection by design, and name the
maintainers as owners of the open setup items.
The per-topic proposals (T02-T18) with their source evidence and the
alternatives that were rejected, plus the per-app work packages, so
reviewers can see why each choice was made.
Adds the proposed architecture for the full plugin and add-on system,
the decision record behind it, and a comparison with the code and the
threat model on main. The gap analysis lists six places where the
design disagrees with decisions already recorded here; those need a
maintainer decision before any code follows the design. Docs only.