Commit Graph
16 Commits
Author SHA1 Message Date
Dylan M. Taylor c13236bf1c ci: lock workflow actions through an actions.lock lockfile
Mutable action tags are a supply-chain risk: a moved tag runs different code
without a diff. Every workflow action is now pinned through
.github/workflows/actions.lock, and CI verifies the lockfile so an out-of-sync
or tampered one fails instead of running.
2026-11-12 10:03:58 -05:00
Dylan M. Taylor 964c71574a ci: use StepSecurity's maintained actions (#9)
Each third-party action that StepSecurity publishes a secure drop-in
replacement for now uses that replacement, pinned to a commit with its
version as a comment. Versions follow what we used: the newest
StepSecurity release in the same major, or the closest major they
publish. dtolnay/rust-toolchain refs that named a toolchain (stable,
nightly, 1.76) become the replacement's `toolchain` input.
2026-11-11 14:57:09 -05:00
Dylan M. Taylor c2ef549959 ci: run Harden-Runner on every job (#7)
Adds step-security/harden-runner (audit, pinned to v2.22.4 like
craft-common-actions) as the first step of each job that did not have it,
so every workflow in the org's public repos reports its egress to
StepSecurity. Audit, not block: block-mode allow lists come from each
job's observed traffic.
2026-11-11 12:09:33 -05:00
FredApps 98a151022a Merge pull request #3 from Elvis33LE/docs/align-threat-model-and-readme
docs: align the threat model and README with the settled maintainer decisions
2026-11-11 15:08:00 +01:00
Elvis33LE 83917e4e03 docs: align the threat model and README with the settled maintainer decisions 2026-11-11 14:47:11 +01:00
FredApps bc3691434a Merge pull request #2 from storytold/ci/cache-from-main
ci: save the cache from main only, bound job times, and move actions off Node 20
2026-11-10 16:45:23 +01:00
FredApps 8d693b7eec ci: save the cache from main only, bound job times, and move actions off Node 20 2026-11-10 15:53:20 +01:00
Jeremy 8fdec26202 Merge pull request #1 from arnav-hiwarkar/docs/plugin-architecture
docs: propose the plugin architecture, its decisions and a gap analysis
2026-11-10 13:18:02 +00:00
arnav-hiwarkar 5ba16aae06 docs: use the reviewer's wording for the native exception 2026-11-10 18:46:52 +05:30
arnav-hiwarkar b2ce37420f docs: apply the review answers
Record the answers to D1-D6, require an outside security review
before public launch and two maintainers for native releases, say that
native plugins are the exception to protection by design, and name the
maintainers as owners of the open setup items.
2026-11-10 18:46:16 +05:30
arnav-hiwarkar 80e865c357 docs: add the topic proposals behind the architecture
The per-topic proposals (T02-T18) with their source evidence and the
alternatives that were rejected, plus the per-app work packages, so
reviewers can see why each choice was made.
2026-11-10 18:22:43 +05:30
arnav-hiwarkar 6a5e1eab48 docs: propose the plugin architecture, its decisions and a gap analysis
Adds the proposed architecture for the full plugin and add-on system,
the decision record behind it, and a comparison with the code and the
threat model on main. The gap analysis lists six places where the
design disagrees with decisions already recorded here; those need a
maintainer decision before any code follows the design. Docs only.
2026-11-10 18:19:28 +05:30
Jeremy a6c5fae8b8 Update README.md 2026-11-04 17:27:49 +00:00
Jeremy 33adcb43a8 ext-store: bounded unpack, state file, atomic install/uninstall/enable/choose-theme, app read side, store location; mutation harness for both crates 2026-10-16 11:07:10 +01:00
Jeremy 1202969f99 ext-core: ids, paths, text, versions, manifest, theme palette and contrast, trust tiers, catalogue index; mutation check (27/27 caught) 2026-10-16 10:57:46 +01:00
Jeremy 5500b37ded Scaffold: workspace, craft-ext-core and craft-ext-store skeletons, threat model, CI 2026-10-16 10:48:21 +01:00