[face-builder] Bound the summed table length before allocating the blob

Table records of a font file may overlap, so the sum of the passed
-through table lengths is not bounded by the size of the font: with
HB_SUBSET_FLAGS_PASSTHROUGH_UNRECOGNIZED a 262 KB font of aliased
records made _hb_face_builder_data_reference_blob() allocate and fill a
~4 GiB buffer, only for hb_blob_create() to refuse it.

Accumulate face_length with hb_unsigned_add_overflows() and return
nullptr as soon as the total reaches 1u<<31, the length
hb_blob_create_or_fail() refuses, so the 2-4 GiB allocate-fill-free
cycle no longer happens; the serializer's own bounds already prevented
any overrun once the sum wrapped.  Output for every input that succeeded
before is unchanged.

The endless retry that turned this into a hang is fixed in the
companion commit (hb_face_reference_blob() no longer recurses into
itself on the fallback builder).

Discovered by Anthropic's OSS Scanner, as vulnerability ANT-2026-NCMHVO1A.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>
This commit is contained in:
Behdad EsfahbodandClaude Opus 4.8 committed 2026-10-30 15:28:07 -06:00
1 parent 8f09a11184
commit dae0a46b4d
1 file changed
+10 -1
+10 -1
View File
@@ -99,7 +99,16 @@ _hb_face_builder_data_reference_blob (hb_face_builder_data_t *data)
unsigned int face_length = table_count * 16 + 12;
for (auto info : data->tables.values())
face_length += hb_ceil_to_4 (hb_blob_get_length (info.data));
if (unlikely (hb_unsigned_add_overflows (face_length,
hb_ceil_to_4 (hb_blob_get_length (info.data)),
&face_length)))
return nullptr;
/* hb_blob_create() refuses such a length; do not assemble the font
* only to throw it away. Tables referenced from a font file can
* overlap in it, so the sum is not bounded by the size of that file. */
if (unlikely (face_length >= 1u << 31))
return nullptr;
char *buf = (char *) hb_malloc (face_length);
if (unlikely (!buf))